Direct Listings and SPACs: The Two Alternative Doors to the Public Market
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In short
The bookbuilt IPO is the front door to public markets, but it is not the only door — and the 2018–2021 period turned two alternatives from curiosities into household terms.
A direct listing puts existing shares straight onto an exchange with no underwritten offering at all; a SPAC (special purpose acquisition company) reverses the sequence entirely — the shell goes public first, then finds a company to become. Each exists because of specific frictions in the traditional IPO — underpricing, fees, dilution, lock-ups — and each carries its own mechanics and its own documented costs, which the SPAC boom of 2020–21 demonstrated at scale. Mechanics and history, per the pillar rule; no view on any listing or vehicle.
Direct listings: the market without the middleman's offering
In a direct listing, the company registers its existing shares and simply lets them begin trading: no new shares are sold, no offer price is set, no allocations are made. On the first morning, the exchange's opening auction — informed by a non-binding reference price and the actual supply of insiders willing to sell against accumulated demand — discovers the price directly, doing in one auction what bookbuilding does over weeks. The trade-offs follow from the design. What the company escapes: the gross spread on an offering, the documented underpricing (there is no offer price to pop from), and often the lock-up (insiders can typically sell immediately — the point, for a company doing this to create liquidity rather than raise money). What it gives up: fresh capital, in the classic format — the mechanism suited companies already well-funded that wanted liquidity and a listing, not proceeds — and the underwriters' stabilisation and distribution machinery; banks still advise, but no one supports the aftermarket. Documented category history: the format was popularised by large, well-known technology companies in 2018–2019 whose successful debuts established the template, and US exchange rules were subsequently amended to permit primary direct listings — raising new capital in the opening auction — though the classic no-raise version remains the common form. Structural honesty: because supply on day one is whatever insiders choose to sell, early trading can be thin and volatile, and the reference price is an orientation, not a promise.
SPACs: the shell that goes public first
A SPAC inverts the sequence. The shell: sponsors raise money in an IPO of a company with no business — typically units at a standard price containing a share plus a fraction of a warrant — and place the proceeds in trust. The search: the shell has a deadline (commonly around two years) to find a private company and merge with it — the de-SPAC — or return the trust to investors. The choice: when a deal is announced, shareholders vote and, crucially, hold a redemption right — each can take back their trust money (roughly the unit price plus interest) instead of riding into the merged company, regardless of how they vote. For the private company, the de-SPAC is a back door to a listing: a negotiated merger with a listed shell, historically marketed as faster and — because merger documents could include projections in ways traditional IPO prospectuses did not — friendlier to story-stage businesses. The costs are structural and documented. Sponsor promote: sponsors typically receive ~20% of the shell's equity for a nominal investment — compensation that dilutes whoever remains after the merger. Warrant overhang dilutes further. Redemption arithmetic: when most shareholders redeem (as became the norm late in the boom), the company receives far less cash than the headline trust while the promote stays intact — concentrating the structure's cost on non-redeeming holders. The documented history is the honest close: the 2020–21 boom saw hundreds of SPACs raise unprecedented sums; the subsequent bust saw widespread post-merger underperformance as a class, high redemption rates, liquidations of shells that found no deal, and — in 2024 — US securities regulators adopting rules aligning de-SPAC disclosure and liability more closely with traditional IPOs, narrowing the differences that had made the route attractive. The academic literature on the episode documents the dilution mechanics as the central explanation for the class's returns; the format survives, at far lower volume, for situations its structure genuinely suits.
Worked example
Worked example (fictional). Horizon Acquisition Corp, a fictional SPAC, IPOs 30M units at $10 — $300M into trust; sponsors hold a 20% promote (7.5M founder shares) bought for $25,000. After 20 months, Horizon announces a merger with Skyfarm, a fictional vertical-farming startup, valuing it at $1.2B. At the vote, holders of 24M of the 30M public shares redeem at $10.08 — $242M leaves the trust, and Skyfarm receives $58M instead of $300M (partially patched by a side placement). The merged company lists with the sponsors' 7.5M shares — earned on $25,000 — now nominally worth $75M, the warrants outstanding, and 6M public holders who stayed. The arithmetic every post-boom study centres on: the promote and warrants cost the same whether $300M or $58M arrives, so the fewer holders remain, the more each one carries. All figures illustrative; the pattern is the documented one.
Frequently asked
5 questions
What is a direct listing?
A company's existing shares simply start trading on an exchange — no underwritten offering, no offer price, no allocations. The opening auction discovers the price. Classic version raises no new money; US rules now also permit capital-raising versions, though the no-raise form remains the common one.
Why would a company choose a direct listing over an IPO?
To avoid the offering's costs: the underwriting spread, the documented first-day underpricing, and typically the lock-up — suiting companies that want liquidity and a listing more than proceeds. The trade: no fresh capital in the classic format, and no underwriter stabilisation in early trading.
What is a SPAC?
A listed shell: sponsors raise cash into trust via an IPO, then have a deadline to merge with a private company (the de-SPAC) or return the money. Investors hold redemption rights — trust money back instead of the merger — and sponsors typically hold a ~20% promote earned for nominal investment.
Why did so many SPACs perform poorly?
The documented central explanation is structural dilution: sponsor promotes and warrants cost the merged company the same regardless of how much trust cash survives redemptions — and late in the boom most cash redeemed, concentrating those costs on remaining holders. Class-level post-merger underperformance followed; 2024 US rules narrowed the route's regulatory differences from IPOs.
Is a de-SPAC company different from an IPO company once public?
Once public, both trade identically; the difference is the door and its footprint — capital structure (warrants, promote), the disclosure package it entered with, and, historically, the use of projections. Post-2024 US rules align de-SPAC disclosure and liability more closely with IPOs, shrinking that difference for new deals.
References
- Investor.gov (SEC) — SPACs (glossary) —
- SEC — Press Release 2024-8: SEC Adopts Rules to Enhance Investor Protections Relating to SPACs, Shell Companies, and Projections (24 January 2024) —
- Corporate Finance Institute — Direct Listing —
Educational and informational only — not investment advice, a recommendation, or an offer to buy or sell any security. Investing involves risk, including the possible loss of principal. Worked examples use fictional companies and figures.